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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mass disasters sometimes require creative remedies.  The tort 
system may not provide the best means of compensation in unusual 
situations like the Agent Orange chemical exposure litigation,1 the 
Virginia Tech shootings,2 the attacks of September 11th (“9/11”),3 and 
the BP oil spill.4  Executive compensation after the financial meltdown 
 
* Attorney, Feinberg Rozen, LLP, Administrator, Gulf Coast Claims Facility.  This article expands 
upon a speech delivered by the author to the Association of American Law Schools on January 7, 
2012. 
 1. Vietnam veterans brought suits against manufacturers that supplied Agent Orange, an 
herbicide used by the United States military to reduce foliage to locate enemies, alleging it 
contained toxins causing them to suffer disease.  In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. 
Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding class action settlement).  
I served as the special master assisting Judge Jack Weinstein in the litigation and in administering 
the fund resulting from the class action settlement.  See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON 
TRIAL:  MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 144-45 (1986). 
 2. On April 16, 2007, an on-campus shooting at Virginia Tech took the lives of 32 students 
and faculty, and injured several others.  The Virginia Tech Administration created “The Hokie 
Spirit Memorial Fund” from unsolicited private donations.  For more information, see Kenneth R. 
Feinberg, Compensating the Victims of Catastrophe:  The Virginia Tech Victims Assistance 
Program, 39 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 181 (2007); Virginia Tech Victim Assistance Program Final 
Protocol (Aug. 15, 2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/08/27/ 
protocol.pdf (last accessed Mar. 26, 2012).  
 3. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO 
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005). 
 4. In what is considered the largest oil spill in history, an offshore drilling rig operated by 
British Petroleum (BP) exploded off the coast of Louisiana on April 20, 2010.  Shannon L. Sole, BP 
Compensation Fund:  A Buoy for Both Claimants and BP, 37 J. CORP. L. 245, 247 (2011).  I was 
1
Feinberg: Unconventional Responses
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
8- FEINBERG_MACRO.DOCM 7/12/2012  3:35 PM 
576 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:575 
may also require new, innovative approaches.5  From my work 
mediating and administering these cases over the last twenty-five years, 
I have concluded that such alternative compensation systems are—and 
should be—rare.   
II.  THE IMPETUS FOR CREATING AN EXCEPTION 
Creative alternatives to the tort system are the exception.  The 
adversarial tort system, although not perfect, works pretty well.  It is a 
part of our historical heritage and engrained into the fabric of this 
country.6  It is thus highly unlikely that Congress or state legislatures 
will set aside two hundred years of history to make massive changes to 
the judicial system.   
However, every once and a while, there is a very visible mass 
disaster in the United States that galvanizes the public and elected 
officials, and triggers a different approach to resolving the remedial 
claims.  This has occurred only a handful of times in the last thirty years 
with disasters such as 9/11 and BP.7  When these types of unprecedented 
disasters have occurred, public officials have occasionally adopted out-
of-the-box approaches to compensating the victims.  But these 
alternative remedies require political consensus in order to avoid 
criticism and ensure the effectiveness of the attempted solution.   
 
appointed to administer the claims fund established by the Obama administration and BP to 
compensate for losses arising from the spill.  For more information, see the claims report at Gulf 
Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, Nov. 20, 2010, available at 
http://documents.nytimes.com/documents-determining-oil-spill-payouts#document/p1 (last accessed 
Mar. 26, 2012). 
 5. The Secretary of the Treasury designated me as special master, or “pay czar,” to make 
compensation determinations involving officials in companies receiving financial help from the 
taxpayers under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  Kenneth R. Feinberg, Symposium on 
Executive Compensation Keynote Address, 64 VAND. L. REV. 349, 350 (2011).  See also Executive 
Compensation and Corporate Governance, 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2010). 
 6. See Robert S. Thompson, Decision, Disciplined Inferences, and the Adversary Process, 13 
CARDOZO. L. REV. 725, 726 (1991) (stating how the adversary process is an integral part of the 
American legal system).  See also Kenneth Feinberg, The September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund of 2012: Policy and Precedent, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2011-2012).  
 7. A private, not public, response may also occur following such examples of mass tragedy.  
The best example is Hurricane Katrina.  Katrina in 2005 was a powerful storm that destroyed much 
of New Orleans and the coastal regions of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.  Nearly 2,000 
people lost their lives and over 200,000 homes were destroyed.  Joseph B. Treaster and Katie 
Zernike, Hurricane Katrina Slams into Gulf Coast; Dozens are Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/national/30storm.html?_r=1&ref=hurricanekatrina; Justice 
Greg G. Guidry, The Louisiana Judiciary:  In the Wake of Destruction, 70 LA. L. REV. 1145, 1145-
46, 1152 (2010).  Private insurers—not the government—established a private claims program to 
compensate insureds. 
2
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The legal and financial genesis for these alternative remedies has 
come from both public and private sources.  With 9/11, Congress 
initiated the option by passing a law, signed by President George W. 
Bush, giving victims a statutory alternative to the tort system.8  The BP 
oil spill required only a handshake between the chief executive officer of 
BP and President Barack Obama.9  With this handshake, BP agreed as a 
private contracting party to an escrow agreement with the Department of 
Justice to provide $20 billion to compensate for the harm from the oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico.10  BP did not worry about contributions 
from its oil rig partners, TransOcean, Halliburton, and Anadarko.  It 
simply reacted to a problem of immense proportion. 
III.  DESIGNING AND ADMINISTERING A SYSTEM 
Once the political consensus justifies an alternative compensation 
system, the question arises as to how this system is to be administered.  
With 9/11, Congress passed a law authorizing the Attorney General of 
the United States to appoint a person, not a committee, to design, 
implement, and administer the remedy.11  No additional confirmation of 
the appointment was required,12 and appeals to the courts of the 
decisions were prohibited by statute.13  There were many unanswered 
questions:  how much would it cost, how much value should be given to 
a life, how many people were physically injured, and what were the 
causal connections between the terrorist attack and the victims?  The 
answers were unclear, but Congress needed to act fast.  With only a day 
of debate, Congress passed the statutory alternative system.14  It 
 
 8. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 
Stat. 230, 237 (Sept. 22, 2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2002)). 
 9. Neil King Jr., Feinberg Ramps Up $20 Billion Compensation Fund, WALL ST. J., June 10, 
2010, at A6 (noting that the fund “has a number of oddities.  It was created as a voluntary compact 
between the U.S. government and BP, but without any act of Congress, executive order or other 
legal anchor.”) 
 10. See David F. Partlett & Russell L. Weaver, BP Oil Spill:  Compensation, Agency Costs, 
and Restitution, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 1349 (2011); Jackie Calmes, For Gulf Victims, 
Mediator With Deep Pockets and Broad Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/us/23feinberg.html?pagewanted=all.  
 11. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 404(a)(1), (2).  See also Final 
Report of the Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf.  
 12. Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund:  An Effective 
Administrative Response to a National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 175 (2005). 
 13. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(3) (“Such a 
determination [of the Special Master] shall be final and not subject to judicial review”). 
 14. Id.; see WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?, supra note 3, at 20.  
3
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provided no funding for the program, instead relying on money from 
petty cash in the U.S. Treasury to pay the claims.   
In BP, there was not even a congressional imprimatur.  A simple 
agreement between the President and BP resulted in a $20 billion fund, 
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”), with an understanding that it 
would be designed and administered by one independent person.  There 
was concern about whether giving one person this type of authority was 
good government or wise precedent, but the disaster called for some type 
of immediate response.  
Once established, there were additional concerns with the GCCF 
about establishing eligibility and causation criteria for individual claims.  
Despite an expert report by Harvard professor John Goldberg explaining 
the importance of proximate cause in assessing the extent of BP’s legal 
liability for economic damages,15 claimants focused only on but-for 
causation.  And it was a huge problem attempting to define eligibility 
and decide who is permitted, in a rather unique elite system, to bypass 
the courts and receive a check.16   
In 9/11, eligibility determinations were somewhat easier.  Proof of 
death was readily available.  There were New York City Police 
Department Certificates of Death, airline manifests, and Pentagon 
military records.  However, it was not so easy to establish criteria for 
physical injury claims.  What constitutes, under the statute, physical 
injury in the “immediate” vicinity of the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon?17  The criteria for eligibility are difficult to define when there 
is the potential of millions of people claiming injury due to the terrorists’ 
attacks.  For example, should a person who fell off a ladder in his 
kitchen and broke his leg when he heard the news of the attacks be 
eligible for compensation?  (The answer was “no.”)   
In BP, eligibility determinations were complicated by the volume 
of claims.  In the first eighteen months of the program, there were over 
one million claims from fifty states and thirty-eight foreign countries.  
Alternative compensation programs make it easy for people to file 
claims, and tend to attract more claimants than might be seen in court.  
 
 15. See John C.P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill (Nov. 22, 2010), http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4595438, reprinted in 30 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 335 (2011) (appendix). 
 16. Eligible individuals under the 9/11 compensation act included a person who was present 
at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or the Shanksville, Pennsylvania crash site at the time or 
in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes and who “suffered physical harm 
or death as a result of such an air crash or debris removal.” Air Transportation Safety and System 
Stabilization Act §§ 402(14)(a), 405(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
 17. Id. 
4
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But they raise more questions of eligibility related to cases of “indirect” 
injury.  For example, should a restaurant in Boston that advertises “the 
best shrimp scampi in town” receive compensation because it can no 
longer get shrimp from the Gulf and lost twelve percent of its clientele?  
(The answer again was “no.”)  Issues of lack of proof also impact 
eligibility determinations.  This was a serious problem, particularly in 
the Gulf of Mexico where you have an underground economy.  A 
fisherman losing money because he can no longer fish in the Gulf offers 
only proof of his license, which fails to establish economic harm from 
the spill.     
Another issue of administration is determining the methodology to 
be used to calculate damages.18  One possibility is to adopt a torts-like 
system and make damages the sum of economic loss and non-economic 
loss.19  This is a time-honored methodology—if it is feasible.  However, 
offering a traditional tort calculation for damages when setting up a 
program such as BP or 9/11 means each individual receives a different 
amount of money, posing serious political problems.  The wife of a 
fireman killed at the World Trade Center did not understand why she 
was awarded a million dollars less than the widow of the banker working 
for Enron in the World Trade Center.  Waiters in the same restaurant 
who earn the same wages may not understand why they received 
unequal compensation, even if the difference is a result of reporting 
different amounts on their income taxes.  These issues of comparative 
equity are prevalent in many alternative compensation systems.  While 
there may be a tort gloss to these alternative remedies, the concerns over 
equity show the extent to which these remedies lie outside of the 
traditional system.  
Other external problems threaten to undercut purely private 
compensation systems like BP’s.  The 1,200,000 private claims that 
arose out of the BP oil spill were unlike anything ever before seen.20  
The sheer magnitude of the claims overwhelmed the system and changed 
the dynamic of the program.  Merely adding more resources is not 
enough.  When you have over a million claims you are not able to afford 
 
 18. One other issue of measuring damages is factoring in collateral offsets—those benefits 
received by victims from collateral sources such as insurance.   
 19. See Harry Zavos, Monetary Damages for Nonmonetary Losses:  An Integrated Answer to 
the Problem of the Meaning, Function, and Calculation of Noneconomic Damages, 43 LOY. LA. L. 
REV. 193 (2009); Ralph Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss 
from Noneconomic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081 (2008). 
 20. OVERALL PROGRAM STATISTICS, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY (Mar. 23, 2012), 
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everyone a hearing and the system becomes mostly ministerial.  In 
contrast, for the 9/11 attacks, everyone had the option of a hearing.  
Individuals reacted differently to the tragedy.  Half of the people were 
not interested in a hearing; the remaining half wanted a hearing and an 
opportunity to vent about life’s unfairness.  The other half just wanted to 
receive their check without a hearing and try and move on.  But the 
hearings were instrumental in promoting the success and credibility of 
the 9/11 program—a supporting factor not present with BP.21   
IV.  ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES SYSTEMS AS PRECEDENT   
It is important to keep in mind that these alternative programs are 
aberrations, not precedent.  They are exceedingly rare and not very often 
considered.  In a torts or remedies course, it is better advised to have a 
real discussion about the future, if any, of class actions than to focus on 
the 9/11 and BP oil spill funds.   
And these types of alternative remedies systems should remain 
exceedingly rare.  This is not just based on my belief that the torts 
system works pretty well.  Even if the tort system worked terribly, there 
is a still a political philosophy dilemma with these programs:  Why 
should just these people get the benefit of these programs?  Bad things 
happen to good people every day in this country.  There was no special 
government program similar to 9/11 or BP set up for Hurricane Katrina; 
the Joplin, Missouri and Tuscaloosa, Alabama tornadoes; the Oklahoma 
City terrorist attacks; or the first World Trade Center terrorist attack in 
1993.22  In American society, we need to use care when setting up very 
special lucrative programs for some people but not for others.  These 
special programs do not sit well with Congress or the American people 
and, frankly, it is not a very good idea.  This problem was seen in the 
“pay czar” executive compensation program.  The government called for 
the Treasury to fix the problem of exorbitant executive pay in the 
 
 21. FEINBERG, supra note 3; see also Robert L. Rabin, September 11 Through the Prism of 
Victim Compensation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 464, 477-79 (2006).   
 22. On February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in the public parking garage located beneath the 
concourse between the two World Trade Center buildings.  Six people were killed and many others 
injured.  See Judith Miller & Don Van Natta Jr., Traces of Terror:  The Intelligence Reports; In 
Years of Plots and Clues, Scope of Al Qaeda Eluded U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/us/traces-terror-intelligence-reports-years-plots-clues-scope-
qaeda-eluded-us.html?scp=2&sq=1993%20world%20trade%20center%20al%20qaeda&st=cse;  In 
re World Trade Center Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713 (2004). 
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aftermath of the financial meltdown, but it did so only for seven 
companies, and only for 175 people.23  
On the other hand, what makes these programs so attractive is the 
legal trend away from class action aggregative resolution and the need to 
fill the gap with some other form of resolution.24  As courts decide cases 
like Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes limiting class actions25 and reject 
class action settlements like Judge Weinstein’s in the Agent Orange 
cases,26 the more likely there will be a push for something creative to fill 
that void.  The question is whether this gap can be satisfied by 
alternative public and private compensation systems?  If you want to 
think creatively about how to deal more effectively with mass tragedies, 
it is better to think within the traditional system of class actions, 
consolidations, and multi-district litigation.    
BP is a good example of why these programs are mere aberrations 
in the judicial system.  Another BP type agreement is unlikely.  Experts 
cannot recall the last time that a company advanced $20 billion four 
weeks after a disaster.  Rather than offering billions to set up a program 
after a disaster, companies are more inclined to litigate.  This is true 
even though there are cases like the Exxon Valdez oil spill that have 
resulted in 22 years of litigation and billions of dollars in damages and 
environmental clean-up costs.27  Despite this extreme possibility, it is 
 
 23. See Feinberg, supra note 5, at 350.  See also Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (2010).    
 24. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, How Can ADR Alleviate Long-Standing Social Problems?, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 785, 789 (2007); Myriam E. Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, After Class:  
Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. ___ 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1928071. 
 25. Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (invalidating certification of class 
of all female employees in Title VII sex discrimination class action for failure to satisfy the 
commonality requirement from lack of sufficient evidence of a common policy of gender 
discrimination in promotions and hiring).  See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schs., 668 F.3d 
481, 486 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that similar to in Walmart, these claims are “highly individualized 
and vastly diverse,” making the class not suitable for a class action); Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 
F.3d 802, 814-16 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the commonality requirement articulated in Walmart 
was not met here because there was variation in the policies among departments and objective, not 
subjective, promotion criteria).  See also Judith Resnick, Fairness in Numbers:  A Comment on 
AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011); 
Erin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, 47 TRIAL 56 (2011).   
 26. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001) (successfully challenging the 
class action settlement in the Agent Orange case because of the failure to provide future claimants 
with adequate legal representation), aff’d in relevant part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). 
 27. On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince 
William Sound, Alaska.  In the days following, the tanker discharged 11 million gallons of oil.  See 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), remanded to Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobile, 
568 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009); Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of 
7
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doubtful that any companies are going to deviate from the usual 
litigation approach and pay upfront like BP.  
BP, though, is pleased with its decision to pursue an alternative 
compensation program.  In just 18 months, the program secured over 
200,000 fully executed releases against BP and any other defendants.28  
BP will worry later about seeking contribution from any jointly 
responsible parties.  BP, however, may regret agreeing upfront to a 
liquidated amount of $20 billion.  The minute BP announced the 
program, claims were filed from dentists, chiropractors, veterinarians—
every conceivable claim.  Most of these were rejected as part of the total 
number of around 600,000 claims denied.  But the very existence of a 
large sum of money invited claims from all fronts. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In summary, sometimes mass disasters lead to creative alternatives 
rather than conventional tort solutions.  However, these alternatives raise 
several issues.  There are procedural issues, such as finding legal 
justification for the implementation of the program and determining the 
appropriate way to administer the program.  Substantively, creating 
these programs requires answering several difficult questions pertaining 
to eligibility and the methodology of calculating payments.  Further, 
there are also external issues to consider, such as political consensus and 
the volume of claims.   
Fortunately, these 9/11 and BP solutions are aberrations.  Because 
of the issues involved, they should remain that way. 
 
Civil Liability, 86 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2011); Partlett & Weaver, supra note 10, at 1348; Ilisja 
Moreland, From the Exxon Valdez to the Deep Water Horizon:  Will BP’s Dollar Reach Where the 
Oil Didn’t?, 14 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.J.117 (2011).  
 28. OVERALL PROGRAM STATISTICS, supra note 20. 
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